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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
On the other hand, however, one must not lose sight of the plight
of the New York City resident. The Supreme Court has declared that
durational residency requirements prerequisite to public assistance
constitute an abridgement of the constitutionally protected right of
freedom of interstate travel. 28 If, at the same time, the courts are will-
ing to uphold public assistance financing programs which require
geographic districts to pay a fixed percentage of their welfare expenses
without regard to the number of recipients within the districts, the
City's taxpayers, and all others in areas paying relatively high welfare
benefits, will be caught in a financial squeeze.
Responsibility for solving this complex problem now lies with the
three-judge district court and its decision promises to have far-reaching
consequences. Despite the Second Circuit's decision in Aguayo v.
Richardson,29 wherein an attack on the state's experimental welfare
programs was repulsed, Richardson is distinguishable on its facts.80 In
any event, the final resolution of this issue will lie with the Supreme
Court.81
AFFIRMATIVE DUTY To INTEGRATE APPLIED To EXCLUDE NON-WHITS
Otero v. New York City Housing Authority
Municipal authorities have an affirmative duty to integrate their
public housing. This responsibility derives from both the equal pro-
tection clause of the Constitution and the Fair Housing Act of 1968.1
interfering with local attempts at solving the problem. 14. at 53-55. But see Serrano v.
Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 97 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971); Note, Equal Educational
Opportunity: A Case for the Children, 46 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 280 (1971).
28 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
29 473 F.2d 1090 (2d Cir. 1973); see pages 278-87 supra for detailed treatment of Aguayo.
80 In Aguayo the plaintiffs were attacking the implementation of two experimental
programs, id., while in Richardson the attack was aimed at the established and continu-
ing scheme. 473 F.2d at 930. While some latitude might be given to the states where
experimental programs are involved, such latitude seems inappropriate where an estab-
lished state scheme is questioned. Moreover, the Aguayo court was able to find that the
programs "suitably furthered" a legitimate state interest. 473 F.2d at 1109. In Richardson,
Judge Kaufman noted that the state "has not offered any rational justification" for the
scheme, nor was it perceivable "what justifying considerations may have motivated the
State legislature to devise a system that appears on the surface discriminatory." 473 F.2d
at 932.
81 Appeals from decisions of three-judge district courts are direct to the Supreme
Court as of right. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970).
142 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. (1970). The Act contains a broad declaration stating: "It is
the policy of the United States to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair
housing throughout the United States." 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1970). The Act also requires
the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to: "(5) administer the programs
and activities relating to housing and urban development in a manner affirmatively to
further the policies of this subchapter." 42 U.S.C. § 3608 (1970). Thus, the affirmative duty
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While the scope of this duty has never been delineated, it has served as
the basis for invalidating both site and tenant selection criteria when
such classifications have had the effect of confining minorities to ghetto
areas. 2 While such a mandate appears on its face to be wholly conso-
nant with the prohibition against discrimination, Otero v. New York
City Housing Authority3 demonstrates the conflict between the duty
to integrate and the anti-discrimination laws.
In a potentially far-reaching decision, the Second Circuit upheld
to integrate arises from the requirement that the Secretary act affirmatively to implement
the policies of the Act. See note 35 infra.
In Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809 (Sd Cir. 1970), the court ordered an injunction
against further development of a federally assisted project until the impact of its location
on racial concentration could be determined. It held that the affirmative duty to integrate
required consideration of racial factors in project site selection. The duty was found to
permeate the collective housing laws:
Read together, the Housing Act of 1949 and the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and
1968 show a progression in the thinking of Congress as to what factors sig-
nificantly contributed to urban blight and what steps must be taken to reverse
the trend or to prevent the recurrence of such blight . . . . Whatever were the
most significant features of a workable program for community improvement in
1949, by 1964 such a program had to be nondiscriminatory in its effects, and by
1968 the Secretary had to affirmatively promote fair housing.
Id. at 816. Similarly, in Banks v. Perk, 341 F. Supp. 1175 (N.D. Ohio 1972), modified,
Civil No. 72-1576 (6th Cir., filed Jan. 8, 1973), the failure to include racial criteria in
determining site selections was held to be violative of the affirmative duty to integrate.
The district court based the duty on the equal protection clause and the Fair Housing
Act. It concluded that the Act
carried with it the clear implication that local housing authorities in conjunction
with Federal agencies responsible for housing programs are to affirmatively insti-
tute action the direct result of which was to be the implementation of the dual
and mutual goals of fair housing and the elimination of discrimination in that
housing.
Id. at 1182. In neither Shannon nor Banks did the duty to integrate conflict with the
Act's prohibition against discrimination, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1970). For an extensive
examination of the Fair Housing Act of 1968 see Chandler, Fair Housing Laws: A
Critique, 24 HASrINGS L.J. 159 (1972).
2 Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970); Banks v. Perk, 341 F. Supp. 1175
(N.D. Ohio 1972). A finding that the site selection policies of the local housing authority
fostered existing patterns of racial segregation was made in Gautreaux v. Chicago
Housing Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969); id. 304 F. Supp. 786 (supplemental judg-
ment order), aff'd, 436 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 922 (1971). The
court held that the tenant selection policies which imposed "elastic quotas" on blacks
in "white projects" were unconstitutional. The Housing Authority sought to defend the
quotas as necessary to avoid racial tensions. 296 F. Supp. at 909. The judgment order
required limitations on the number of units available to neighborhood residents and
permitted the tenant assignment plans of the previously white projects to "contain provi-
sions designated to assure that such projects do not become racially segregated." 804 F.
Supp. at 740. The concern appears to have been that the projects would remain pre-
dominantly white. In Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 882 (N.D. Ga. 1971), aff'd, 457 F.2d
788 (5th Cir. 1972), the court similarly held that concentration of local housing projects
within the city limits denied the plaintiffs equal protection and violated the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970). See also Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of
Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970); Blackshear Residents Organization v. Housing
Auth., 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973).
8484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1978).
1973]
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the right of a public housing authority to limit admissions of non-
whites in order to ensure the racial balance of a community.4 Judge
Mansfield, writing for a unanimous panel,5 held that when a New York
City Housing Authority regulation giving former area residents first
priority admission status to new projects" conflicts with the Authority's
duty to integrate, the latter must prevail. Accordingly, the Authority
may limit the number of apartments to be made available to per-
sons of white or non-white races, including minority groups, where
it can show that such action is essential to promote a racially bal-
anced community and to avoid concentrated racial pockets that
will result in a segregated community.7
The City had taken title to a 14-block urban renewal area on
Manhattan's lower east side for the purpose of constructing a low and
middle income housing project known as the Seward Park Extension.
Residents of the urban renewal area were informed at the time of their
relocation that, pursuant to a revised regulation, they would have
first priority to return to any housing built within the renewal area.8
4 The court adopted the plaintiffs' terminology of "non-whites" which included
Puerto Ricans, the majority of the plaintiffs' class, as well as blacks and orientals. Id. at
1126 n.4.
S Joining Judge Mansfield were Judges Hays and Mulligan.
6 The Authority's regulation regarding admissions set forth the following order of
priorities:
1. site residents of the site upon which the project was built, and if the project
is within an urban renewalarea, model city area, or other redevelopment area,
site residents of sites acquired to effectuate the plan for such area;
2. families in emergency need of housing, including families who are homeless,
under order of eviction, living in buildings condemned as unfit for human
habitation, living under housing conditions which because of illness or disease
endanger life, or facing displacement from sites, buildings of dwelling units,
being cleared or vacated by governmental action;
B. families residing under extremely substandard conditions, and severely handi-
capped persons who reside under conditions which create extreme hardship;
4. families residing under grossly overcrowded conditions;
5. families residing under conditions which create a health hardship for one or
more persons;
6. families residing under other substandard or hardship conditions.
GM 1810, as cited by the district court in the appendix to the preliminary injunction,
Otero v. New York City Housing Auth., 344 F. Supp. 737, 748 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
7484 F.2d at 1140.
8 A prior regulation would have given first priority status only to those persons who
actually resided on the physical location of the housing project, referred to by the court
as "project site residents." The amended regulation, note 6 supra, expanded the priority
status to residents of locations acquired to implement the overall plan called "urban
renewal site residents." The court referred to the two groups together as "former site
occupants."
Since the revised regulation was promulgated after the City took title to the urban
renewal area, the Authority argued that it should not be applied in the instant case. The
court rejected this argument:
Having bound itself to that course in statements to plaintiffs, having publicly
held itself out as prepared to follow that course with respect to this project and
having in fact acted accordingly, it could not switch back in mid-stream to its
earlier policy, even though it might have done so ab initio.
484 F.2d at 1132.
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When the low income project was near completion, the offer was again
renewed. The response was overwhelming and unexpected. 9
The Authority later reneged on its promise and agreed to lease a
substantial number of apartments to non-renewal area residents, most
of whom were white. While 161 of the 360 apartments went to prior
occupants of the area, the remainder were rented to individuals having
lower priorities despite a lengthy waiting list of former area residents
who sought to return. Included in the 171 non-area families selected
were 48 who had been granted transfers in order to be closer to a
synagogue where they traditionally had worshipped.
The Authority defended its actions on the theory that the admis-
sion of additional former area residents would tip the racial balance of
the project and, in turn, that of the community. It argued that this
would ultimately lead to segregation and thus force a violation of its
affirmative duty to integrate. Undisputed facts indicated that 60 percent
of the former area residents who had been granted leases were non-
white whereas 88 percent of the non-area residents selected were
white.'0 Projections showed that the completed buildings would become
80-20 in favor of non-whites if the regulations were followed but would
have a 60-40 white majority if the Authority could disregard the
priority status of former area residents."
A complaint was filed on behalf of a class of non-whites which
included prior residents of the renewal area as well as persons in
emergency need of housing or in already crowded projects. The plain-
tiffs sought injunctive relief alleging discrimination in violation of the
Civil Rights Acts,' 2 including the Fair Housing Act of 1968.13 Further-
more, they alleged that the house of worship transfers were based on a
religious criterion and, therefore, violated the establishment clause of
the first amendment.
On cross motions for summary judgment, the district court granted
an injunction against the Authority holding that, although it had a
duty to integrate, it could not act at variance with its own regulation. 14
9 The Authority had found through past experience that only 4% of those given an
opportunity to return exercise their option. In this case, however, 27%. of those with
former site priority sought to enter the completed project. In fact, the number of
applications from former site occupants exceeded the total number of apartments built.
In addition to the 161 who were granted leases, 322 former residents remained on the
waiting list. 484 F.2d at 1126.
10 Id. at 1128.
11 Id.
12 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-83, 2000d (1970).
13Id. §§ 3604, 3608 (1970).
14 Otero v. New York City Housing Auth., 54 F. Supp. 941, 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
judge lasker granted a permanent injunction which barred the Authority:
(1) from renting any apartments in its Seward Park Extension buildings to any
1973]
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Once the regulation was found valid, due process required that the
Authority adhere to it even though it originally could have promul-
gated different selection criteria. 5 The court expressed a belief that
the Fair Housing Act and subsequent decisions interpreting it do not
"require affirmative action to achieve integration at the expense of
minority groups."'61 Although it acknowledged that its primary holding
rendered the question nonessential, the district court found the use of
religious criteria in the case of the house of worship transferees uncon-
stitutional.
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed and remanded, holding
that the Authority would be justified in ignoring its own selection
criteria, if "adherence to [the regulation] would tend to precipitate a
racial imbalance which might ultimately prevent the Authority from
exercising its duty to maintain integration in the community."'17 In
addition, it remanded for a determination of whether, as alleged, the
house of worship transfers were made on non-religious grounds, namely
to protect the transferees from physical and verbal assaults. The court
held that a transfer based on such neutral grounds would no more
offend the establishment clause than a transfer to avoid harassment of
persons because of physical attributes, race, or national origin.'8
individual or family unless and until all former site occupants, who were
eligible (without regard to housing need) and have applied for and for whom
there is an apartment of appropriate size, are offered leases in the building,
(2) from allowing any individuals or families who are not former site occupants
to whom it has rented apartments in the Seward Park Extension buildings
from taking possession of the apartments unless and until all former site
occupants, who are eligible (without regard to housing need) and have
applied for and for whom there is an apartment of appropriate size, are
offered leases in the buildings; and
(3) from leasing apartments on a priority basis to persons seeking proximity to
their house of worship.
Judge Frankel's opinion granting a preliminary injunction is reported in 344 F. Supp.
737 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
15 354 F. Supp. at 950. See note 8 supra; Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 365 (1953). It is
immaterial that the agency could have instituted different procedures de novo. Vitarelli
v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 539-40 (1959).
In determining whether or not the Authority's disregard of a valid regulation violates
due process, it is significant that the directive was well publicized and that the agency
could expect reliance upon it. United States v. Leahey, 434 F.2d 7, 11 (Ist Cir. 1970).
See generally United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954); United
States ex rel. Donham v. Resor, 436 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1971).
16 354 F. Supp. at 953 (emphasis in original).
17484 F.2d at 1137. See text accompanying note 7 supra.
18484 F.2d at 1139. The Supreme Court has indicated that: "[T]he Establishment
Clause stands at least for the proposition that when government activities touch on the
religious sphere, they must be secular in purpose, even-handed in operation and neutral
in primary impact." Gillete v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 450 (1971).
The more recent decision of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971), indicates
that there is a tripartite test: "First, the statute must have a secular legislature purpose;
second, its principle or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion, Board of Education v. Allen, 393 U.S. 236, 243 (1968); finally, the statute must
[Vol. 48:262
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In assessing the potential impact of further admissions of non-
white former area residents, Judge Mansfield stressed the so-called
"tipping effect." 19 According to this theory there exists a theoretical
maximum ratio of minority members to whites beyond which the
whites will flee a given area at a sudden accelerated pace, causing it to
become predominantly inhabited by members of the minority group.20
Thus, the primary concern was not merely with the racial makeup of
the Seward Park Extension, but rather that a racially one-sided project
might destroy the racial balance of the outlying area.21 On remand,
the district court was to take the tipping effect into consideration.
It would also have to perform the difficult task of defining the relevant
area in which the effect was to be considered.22 The Otero panel spe-
cifically rejected the district court's speculation that, because of the
large number of moderate-income units and units for the elderly
planned for the remainder of the project, the overall urban renewal
area would become 82 percent white if the defendant prevailed, but
only 73 percent white if the plaintiffs were successful.m
not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion' .... The instant case
deals with an agency's actions rather than a statute or regulation. The court expressed
concern that these matters were left to an "ad-hoc determination." 484 F.2d at 1139.
One question still remaining is that assuming the house of worship transfers are
not violative of the establishment clause, how may the Authority ignore the remaining
order of allocation set forth in its regulation? See note 6 supra. One answer might be
that since they are transferees, there is no net loss in the total number of public housing
units available, and they are, therefore, not subject to the regulation's priorities.
39484 F.2d at 1135-37. See Hellerstein, The Benign Quota, Equal Protection, and
"The Rule in Shelley's Case," 17 RurrGRs L. Rav. 531, 538 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
Hellerstein]; Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World- The Problems of Special
Treatment, 61 Nw. U.L. Rv. 388, 390 (1966); Navasky, The Benevolent Housing Quota,
6 How. UJ. 30, 31 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Navasky]. See also 85 HARv. L. REv. 870,
875-76 (1972); Note, Developments in the Law- Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. Rv.
1065, 1106 (1969).
20 Hellerstein, supra note 19, at 533; Navasky, supra note 19, at 31.
21 The population of the lower east side had shifted from 58.9% white and 41.1%
non-white in 1965 to a ratio in 1970 of 51.7% non-white to 48.3% white. 484 F.2d at
1136. The district court took the position that the return of former area residents could
not, by definition, upset the community's balance. 354 F. Supp. at 954. The Second Cir-
cuit disagreed and held that on remand the Authority would have the opportunity to
show that a heavy concentration on non-whites in the project, whether or not the in-
dividuals were originally from the area, could "tip" the surrounding community. 484
F.2d at 1136-37.
22 The Otero panel, as well as the parties, discussed the impact of the project both
within the confines of the urban renewal area, and the broader periphery of the entire
lower east side. The court left the task of defining the bounds of the "community" for
the district court. In the final analysis, this may prove to be the most important con-
sideration when applying the principles suggested in the court's opinion. The tipping
factor may be likened to a pebble dropped into a pond -the impact of a segregated
project would naturally be greatest in the areas closest to the project.
2a3 54 F. Supp. at 946, 484 F.2d at 1137. In remanding, the court ruled that at
trial:
the parties would be permitted to offer evidence as to the relevant community,
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Benign quotas have at times been suggested to lessen the impact
of the tipping effect.2 4 Basically, there are limitations imposed on the
number of members of racial or ethnic groups which may enter a given
housing development with the underlying purpose of achieving and
maintaining integration.2 The primary difference between the tradi-
tional notion of a benign quota and the limitation in Otero is that in
the latter a subjective test is suggested rather than a fixed ratio.2 6
Benign quotas insure that a policy of open housing does not result in
unconscious de facto segregation. This policy has been criticized on
the ground that it is a government-sanctioned use of race as a basis for
allocating benefits, thus leading to a double standard.27 Furthermore,
they invariably lead to denial of an individual's access to living quar-
ters solely because of race.28 The legality of such quotas is rendered
the impact of adherence to the priority regulation, including the declining white
population in that community, the effect of transfers from other locations in the
community to the Seward Park Project, estimates as to the total racial composition
of the Urban Renewal Area upon completion, and the racial composition of the
available population that is eligible for public housing.
484 F.2d at 1137.
24 Hellerstein, supra note 19; Navasky, supra note 19; Wofford, Notre Dame Con.
ference on Civil Rights: A Contribution to the Development of Public Law, 35 NoR.
DAmru LAw. 328, 366 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Wofford]. In Progress Dev. Corp. v.
Mitchell, 182 F. Supp. 681 (N.D. Ill. 1968), a private developer attempted to establish a
housing project with an 80% white to 20% non-white benign quota as established
through covenants in the deeds. Upon learning that the project was intended to be in-
terracial, the local town, pursuant to a referendum, condemned the land for a park.
The developer filed suit under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-83, 1985, 1988
(1957), seeking an injunction and damages. The relief was denied on the grounds, inter
alia, that he had failed to establish the alleged conspiracy and lacked "dean hands" in
that his project was an attempt to circumvent Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
25 Hellerstein, supra note 19, at 533. The court did not reject the categorization of
the Authority's limitation as a benign quota. 484 F.2d at 1136.
26 The Otero court did not speak in terms of an absolute or fixed quota. Rather, the
controversy before it required the assessment of the impact of admitting a large group of
the plaintiffs' class at one time. The court attempted to establish a subjective test. The
language of the court varied throughout the opinion, "[the district court must be
satisfied that adherence to [the regulation] would probably lead to eventual ghettoization
of the community." Id. at 1136. The trial court must determine "whether adherence to
[the regulation] would tend to precipitate a racial imbalance .... ." Id. at 1137. The
regulation may be disregarded "where [the Authority] can show that such action is
essential to promote a racially balanced community and to avoid concentrated racial
pockets that will result in a segregated community." Id. at 1140.
27 It has been convincingly argued that:
the government's intentional and explicit use of race as a criterion of choice is
bound -no matter how careful the explanation that this is a "good" use of
race- to weaken the educative force of its concurrent instruction that a man
is to be judged as a man, that his race has nothing to do with his merit. Citizens,
thus besieged by what will understandably, be taken to represent two conflicting
government endorsed principles, are likely to listen to the voice they wish to hear.
Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YAL L.J. 1205,
1259 (1970).
28 Horowitz, Fourteenth Amendment Aspects of Racial Discrimination in "Private"
Housing, 52 CAtitF. L. Rav. 1, 42-45 (1964).
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even more doubtful in light of recent federal anti-discrimination legis-
lation,29
The court found the overriding duty to integrate mandated by
the equal protection clause as well as by the broad declaration of
policy contained in the Fair Housing Act,30 Decisions enforcing this
duty have often arisen where the policy of a local housing authority has
limited low income projects to areas already concentrated with mi-
nority groups.P1 Housing authorities, therefore, have been required to
consider the probable racial composition of a given project and the
effect of its location on the outlying area, 2 Viewed as a mandate in
planning, the duty to integrate has never been applied so as to deny
a particular class of persons admission to a project solely because of
their race.
The equal protection clause does not prohibit racial classifications
per se.83 Although subject to rigid scrutiny, such classifications will be
upheld if they are shown to be the only practical means of achieving a
compelling state interest.8 4 The Fair Housing Act, however, expressly
29 After a lengthy discussion of housing quotas, Mr. Navasky concludes:
Where a publidy-imposed benevolent quota works to deny any individual
of an accommodation solely because of race, I think a court should, and probably
would, hold it unconstitutional.
The best way for the courts to handle the problem would be to use the
"reasonable alternatives" formulation.
In a world of limited energies, people interested in integrated housing
should work for passage and effective enforcement of non-discrimination laws and
alsq to increase the housing supply. These approaches are more basic than the
quota approach,
The benevolent quotn, while not intrinsically bad, is potentially dangerous.
Let uis first try and get our integrated housing through site selection, pricing,
promotion, and other such techniques. If this does not work, private developers
might then, with cause, rely heavily on quotas.
Navasky, supra note 19, at 68.
Although favoring quotas, a doubt as to their constitutionality was also expressed in
Wofford, supra note 22, at 866. The passage of the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C.
§ .601 et seq. (1970), subsequent to the expression of these views, places an additional
hurdle in the way of their constitutionality. See note 82 and accompanying text infra.
30 484 F.2d at 1133. See note 1 and accompanying text supra.
31 See note 2 and accompanying text supra.
32 Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809, 821-22 (3d Cir. 1970); Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous-
ing Auth., 304 F. Supp. 736, 740 (N.D. II. 1969).
83 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
84 The Supreme Court, per Chief Justice Warren, noted that
Ealt the very least, the Equal Protection Clause demands that racial classifications,
. be subjected to the "most rigid scrutiny," Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214, 216 (1944), and, if they are ever to be upheld, they must be shown to
be necessary to the accomplishment of some permissible state objective, indepen-
dent of the racial discrimination which it was the object of the Fourteenth
Amendment to eliminate.
Zd. at 11. In Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redev. Agency, 895 F,2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968), the
court reversed a dismissal of a complaint which in substance alleged that the plaintiff
class, composed of Blacks and Puerto Riquns, had been denied equal treatment in the
municipality's relocation program for those displaced by its urban renewal projects. Judge
Smith, writing for the Second Circuit, realized that
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bans all forms of racial discrimination in housing governed by the
Act.35 Included in this prohibition are statements or notices indicating
a preference or limitation based on race.86 Implicit in the Otero hold-
ing is that the duty to limit housing on a racial basis, where the failure
to do so would lead to segregation, is a constitutionally founded
doctrine.8 7 This inescapably leads to the paradox of state denial of
equal protection in the name of equal protection.
[w]hat we have said may require classification by race. That is something which
the Constitution usually forbids, not because it is one which usually, to our
national shame, has been drawn for the purpose of maintaining racial in-
equality. Where it is drawn for the purpose of achieving equality it will be
allowed, and to the extent it is necessary to avoid unequal treatment by race, it
will be required.
Id. at 931-32 (footnotes omitted). In Otero there was no allegation that whites were
receiving unequal treatment in the allocation of public housing. Since an Otero limita-
tion is based on the tipping effect, non-whites would always constitute a minority of
any project in which it was applied. The racial classifications suggested in Otero are
preventative measures against the possibility of segregation in the future. The Second
Circuit did not consider the application of strict scrutiny standards in the instant case.
In light of the extensive treatment of these standards elsewhere in this Second Circuit
Note, it is not necessary to consider this point further. See Boraas v. Village of Belle
Terre, supra p. 262.
85 The Fair Housing Act of 1968, with limited exceptions for single family homes
and small rooming houses, makes it unlawful:
(a) To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse
to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or
deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, or national
origin.
(b) To discriminate against any person in terms, conditions, or privileges of
sale rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in
connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, or national origin.
(c) To make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed or published
any notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental
of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination
based on race, color, religion or national origin, or an intention to make
any such preference, limitation, or discrimination.
(d) To represent to any person because of race, color, religion, or national
origin that any dwelling is not available for inspection, sale, or rental
when such dwelling is in fact so available.
(e) For profit, to induce or attempt to induce any person to sell or rent
any dwelling by representations regarding the entry or prospective
entry into the neighborhood of a person or persons of a particular race,
color, religion, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2604 (1970).
Under the regulations governing federally-assisted programs funded by HUD:
A recipient . . may not, directly or through contractual or other arrangements,
on the ground of race, color, or natural [sic] origin: ...
(v) Treat a person differently in determining whether he satisfies any occupancy,
admission, enrollment, eligibility, membership, or other requirement or condition
which persons must meet in order to be provided any housing, accommodations,
facilities, services, financial aid, or other benefits provided under the program or
activity;
24 C.F.R. § 1.4 (1973). In the instant case, HUD had been a defendant in the original
action but was dismissed as a party by the district court since adequate relief was
available against the Authority, and no active discrimination was alleged on the part of
HUD. 854 F. Supp. at 957. In addition to the Fair Housing Act and HUD regulations,
discrimination in public housing is prohibited by N.Y. CIVIL RxGrrs LAw § 18-c (McKinney
Supp. 1973).
3042 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (1970). See note 85 supra.
87 The court referred to "the Authority's constitutional and statutory duty to promote
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SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE, 1972 TERM
An expansion of the Otero rule to other areas might lead to a
subversion of civil rights legislation. Conceivably, a school district,
despite a ban on discrimination, could limit the number of black or
Hispanic students where it can show that admission of additional
members of that group "would tend to precipitate a racial imbal-
ance.' 38 It would no doubt be argued that since the goal of the limita-
dons is to prevent segregation, it is in perfect harmony with Brown v.
Board of Education.0 Of course, Otero could not effectively be used by
minorities to the detriment of whites since the tipping effect, by its
nature, relates only to an influx of non-whites. Furthermore, an Otero
limitation on minorities might be made well below the 50 percent
mark.
Used properly, the affirmative duty to integrate is a powerful tool
essential to achieving an important national goal. In the area of
housing, it can ensure that local authorities do not limit lower income
housing projects to ghetto neighborhoods. It may provide the impetus
to build attractive middle income housing in racially mixed areas with
the intent of drawing in a larger white population.
It is unrealistic and unlawful for a housing authority to take a
totally "color blind" attitude in planning for the housing needs of a
community.40 However, an ill-defined duty to integrate may lead to
social engineering at variance with an individual's right to be free
from subjection to racial discrimination. 41 In housing, as a minimum
restraint, the duty should not be applied so as to conflict with the Fair
Housing Act's prohibition against discrimination.
The Otero court was required to make its potentially far-reaching
decision not in a neatly defined test case but in a controversy wherein a
decision either way would adversely affect numerous innocent per-
integrated housing . . . [as] paramount" but acknowledged that the duty does not
automatically require invalidation of the regulation. 484 F.2d at 1135.
38 See note 17 and accompanying text supra.
39347 U.S. 483 (1954). An affirmative duty to integrate has been found to exist in
the area of school desegregation. The Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Jefferson County
Bd. of Educ., 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967), established
a "freedom of choice" plan to insure integration in local schools. The court based its
holding on the premise that: "Boards and officials administering public schools ...have
the affirmative duty under the Fourteenth Amendment to bring about an integrated,
unitary school system . I..." in Jefferson County, there was an allegation that the schools
were in fact segregated, and that only affirmative action could eliminate that pre-existing
condition. In Otero, the Authority argued that the community would in the future be-
come segregated if steps were not presently taken.
40 Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809, 820 (3d Cir. 1970).
41 The Second Circuit has ruled that due process requires the Authority to adopt
"orderly procedure[s] for allocating its scarce supply of housing ...... Holmes v. New
York City Housing Auth., 398 F.2d 262, 265 (2d Cir. 1968).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:262
sons.42 Unfortunately, its holding may prove a source of abuse. Since
many of our cities are faced with critical housing shortages and the
on-going problem of whites fleeing to the suburbs, leaving central cities
to become segregated ghettos, local municipalities are confronted with
the challenge of reversing this trend and thwarting further neighbor-
hood deterioration. An increasing burden will be placed on the courts
to insure that individual rights are not sacrificed to achieve this goal.
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF NEWSMEN PROTECTED
Baker v. F. & F. Investment
The extent of a news reporter's right to refuse to reveal a confi-
dential news source has been the subject of much recent discussion and
judicial consideration. In the much publicized case of Branzburg v.
Hayes1 the Supreme Court ruled that the constitutional protections of
the first amendment cannot be invoked by a newsman seeking to pro-
tect his confidential source from the inquiry of a grand jury.2 The
rationale in Branzburg was that the public's interest in having the
grand jury receive everyman's evidence outweighs the newsman's right
to withhold his confidential source.8 Thus, absent an effective statutory
42 A decision for the plaintiffs would have invalidated 171 leases, whereas a reversal
may mean the judicially-sanctioned breach of a lawful promise made to some 322 tenants.
1408 U.S. 665 (1972).
2 The three cases consolidated for argument in Branzburg are summarized as follows:
(1) Branzburg v. Hayes, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970): Paul Branzburg,
an investigative reporter for the Louisville (Ky.) Courier-Journal was sub-
poenaed before a grand jury, but refused to reveal the identity of his con-
fidential sources who had supplied information about local drug abuse
practices. The Kentucky High Court declined to quash the subpoenas; the
Supreme Court affirmed.
(2) Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970): Earl Caldwell, a
New York Times reporter, brought an action to quash subpoenas ordering
him to appear and testify before a grand jury investigating local activities
of the Black Panther Party. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
quashed the subpoenas; the Supreme Court reversed.
(3) In re Pappas, 358 Mass. 604, 266 N.E.2d 297 (1971): Paul Pappas, a reporter
for WTEV-TV (New Bedford, Mass.), appeared before a grand jury, but
refused to answer questions concerning his attendance at a local Black
Panther Party meeting. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts de-
dined to quash the subpoena and ruled: "We adhere to the view that there
exists no constitutional newsmen's privilege either qualified or absolute, to
refuse to appear and testify before a court or grand jury." 266 N.E.2d at
302-33. The Supreme Court refused to disturb the holding.
8 This broad statement, however, belied the reasoning used in Branzburg. Mr. Justice
Powell, whose concurring opinion represented the crucial swing vote, wrote, in the
strongest terms, that the balancing test approach has not lost its vitality:
[I]f the newsman is called upon to give information bearing only a remote and
tenuous relationship to the subject of the investigation, or if he has some other
reason to believe that his testimony implicates confidential source relationships
without a legitimate need of law enforcement, he will have access to the Court on
a motion to quash and an appropriate protective order may be entered. The
